





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5. Recommendations: a. That combat wings always compains three groups, spaced close enough for mutual support, on deep penatrations and that the interval between combat wings be as close as is flyable in order to cut down the over-all distance from the head to the tail of the column. This should result in a more even distribution of fighter attacks with lower average loss per group. Enoug staffeln near their fuel limits did not try to catch preceding groups but consentrated on the tail of the long column we presented on

b. That fighter escores give particular attention to protection of rear groups on deep penetrations. I sould juige that 17,000 feet, our base altitude, was too low - an aukward altitude for P-47's - even if fighter seport

had covered us, which it didn't.

c. That emphasis on deflection shooting on the part of our gummers be continued and intensified. A B-17 group can put out tresendous fire power, and the looth Group did some accurate shooting, but too many of the gummers were firing on targets that had just left.

de that groups expecting to operate on the return trip from North African omes carry with them engine, gun and radio compartment covers for pro-

toction against dust and mud.

e. That continued thought be given to further protective seasures in the formation for the low equadron, which in our group, at least, was the A.P. for

I. That better exchange of information be provided between air divisions. Even several days efter a mission, groups in the 4th air Division have little

Wen several days efter a mission, groups in the 4th air Division have little modeledge of shart aspensed to the lat air Division, except through hearsay.

g. That 30 combat missions be remosed to 25 for crows that have engaged in deep penetrations. It takes a rugged constitution to stand up to missions like begensburg and even the toughest crew members were badly shaken by nearly two hours under persistent attack. The leas palegmatic were already potential dandidates for the rest home when we landed in Africa. By four provious missions, in one of which our bombardier was killed, were pieces of make in comparison to the 11 hour Regensburg show, and I doubt if 20 such normal missions would take the same amount out of a man as one members int to Engage. missions would take the same amount out of a man as one manuscrint to Regons-

4. Awards; The following suggested awards are recommended to the attention of the Group Commander.


a. Distinguished Flying Cross: To every combat cress member of the 100th droup who participated in the Regensburg mission, for courage and achievement in enabling the group to reach and successfully bomb a vital target against odds that could easily have resulted in 1005 loss had it not been for the outstanding air discipline of the group as a whole. A tight formation was hold, in spite of reshuffling of the group from consecutive losses, and cool juigment and self-pointrol sero exercised by individual cross under prolonger strain.


b. Distinguished Service Gross:

Lajor John Mids, group leader, for heroism and skill in his leadership of the group to target and final destination. This it-year-old officer carried his age and experience. He had had only three previous combat missions.

Lajor William Veal, leader of the high squadron, for heroic and skill-

full leadership of his squadron. Just before turning in to the bombing run, a camon shell hit his #5 engine, setting it on fire, and expen failure occurred. Instead of turning toward the safety of the sales border, approximately 65 miles distant, Major Yeal feathered his #5 prop, a mure tip-off to the





2. When the 100th Group crossed the coast of Holland south of The Hague at 1008 hours at our base altitude of 17,000 feet, I was well situated to watch the proceedings, being cepilot in the lead ship of the last element of the high squadron. The Group had all of its 21 B-17F's tucked in tightly and was within handy supporting distance of the 95th Group, ahead of us at 18,000 feet. We were the last and lowest of the seven groups of the 4th Air Division that were visible ahead on a south-east course, forming a long, loose-linked chain in the bright sunlight—too long, it seemed. Wide gaps separated the three combat wings. As I sat there in the tail—and element of that many some forebeding that might come to the last man about to run a gauntlet lined with spiked clubs. The premonition was well founded.


At 1017 hours, near Woensdrecht, I saw the first flak blossom out in our vicinity, light and inaccurate. A few minutes later, approximately 1025 hours, two FW-190's appeared at 1 o'clock level and whizsed through the formation ahead of us in a frontal attack, nicking two B-17's of the 95th Group in the wings and breaking away beneath us in half-rolls. Smoke immediately trailed a high rate of closure, the guns of our group went into action. The pungent of nose and ball-turret guns. I saw pieces fly off the wing and one of the fighters before they passed from view.

Here was early action. The members of the crew sensed trouble.


There was something desperate about the way those two fighters came in fast right out of their climb without any preliminaries. For a few seconds the interphone was busy with admonitions: "lead 'em mere"... "short bursts"... "don't throw rounds away"... "there'll be more along in a minute".

Three minutes later, the gunners reported fighters climbing up from all around the clock, singly and in pairs, both FW-190's and Me-109G's. This was only my fourth raid, but from what I could see on my side, it looked like too many fighters for sound health. A coordinated attack followed, with the head-on fighters coming in from slightly above, the 9 and 3 c'clock attackers approaching from about level, and the rear attackers from slightly below.

Every gun from every B-17 in our group and the 95th were firing, criss-crossing squirted from the wings of the Jerry single-seaters. I would estimate that 75% of our fire was inaccurate, falling astern of the target-particularly the fire from hand-held guns. Nevertheless, both sides got hurt in this clash,



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Ten minutes, twenty minutes, thirty minutes, and still no let-up in the attacks. The fighters queued up like a breadline and let us have it. Each second of time had a cannon shell in it. The strain of being a clay duck in the wrong end of that aerial shooting gallery became almost intolerable as the minutes accumulated towards the first hour.

Our B-17 shock steadily with the fire of its .50's and the air inside was


Our H-17 shock steadily with the fire of its .50's and the air inside was heavy with moke. It was cold in the cockpit, but when I looked across at Lt. Thomas Murphy, the pilot, and a good one, sweat was pouring off his forehead and over his oxygen mask. He turned the controls over to me for a mile. It was a blessed relief to concentrate on holding station in formation instead of watching those everlasting fighters boring in. It was possible to forget the fighters. Then the top-turet gunner's twin mussles would pound away a foot above my head, giving a realistic initation of cannon-shells exploding in the cockpit, while I gave an even better imitation of a man jumping six inches out of his seate.

A B-17 of the 95th Group, with its right Tokyo tanks of fire, dropped back to about 200 feet above our right wing and stayed there while V of the crew management successively bailed out. Four ment out the bemb-bay and executed delayed jumps, one bailed from the mose, opened his chute prematurely and nearly fouled the tail. Another went out the left waist-gun opening, delaying his 'chute opening for a safe interval. The tailgumer dropped out of his batch, apparently pulling the ripord before he was clear of the ship. His 'chute opened instant-aneously, barely missing the tail, and jerked him so hard that both his shoes came off. He hung limp in the harness, whereas the others had showed immediate signs of life after their 'chutes opened, shifting around in the harness. The B-17 then dropped back in a medium spiral and I did not see the pilots leave. I saw it just before it passed from view, several thousand fact below us, with its right wing a solid sheet of yellow flame.

After we had been under constant attack for a solid hour, it appeared cartain that the 100th Bomb Group was faced with annihilation. Seven of our group had been shot down, the sky was still mottled with rising fighters and it was only 1120 hours, with target-time still 55 minutes away. I doubt if a man in the group visualized the possibility of our getting much further without 100% less. I know that I had leng since mentally accepted the fact of death, and that it was simply a question of the next second or the next minute. I learned first-hand that a man can resign himself to the certainty of death without becoming panicky. Our group fire power was reduced \$35, ammunition was running low. Our tail-guns had to be replenished from another gunstation. Gunners were becoming exhausted and nerve-tortured from the prolonged strain, and there was an awareness on every ody's part that momething must have gone wrong. We had been the aiming point for what seemed like most of the Lurtwaffe and we fully expected to find the rest of it primed for us at the target.

Fighter tactics were rugning true to form. Frontal attackers hit the low squadron and lead squadron, while rear attackers went for the highl. The

Fighter tactics were rushing true to form. Frontal attackers hit the low squadron and lead squadron, while rear attackers went for the high. The manner of their attacks showed that some p lots were old-timers, I some amaspired with a fanatical determination to stop us before we got there. The old-timers came in on frontal attacks with a noticeably slower rate of closure, apparently throttled back, obtaining greater accuracy than those that bolted through us wide out. They did some nice shooting at ranges of 500 or more yards, and in many cases a used able to time their thrusts so as to catch the top pilots were pressing attacks home to 250 yards and less to get TAM hits, offering point-



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blank targets on the break-away, firing long bursts of 20 seconds, and, in some cases, actually pulling up instead of going down and out. Several PW pilots pulled off some first rate deflection sheeint on side attacks against the high group, then raked the low group on the bread-way out of a side slip, keeping the nest cocked up in the turn to prolong the period the formation was in their sights.

I observed what I believe was an attempt at air-to-air bombing, although I didn't see the bombs dropped. A patch of 75 to 100 grey-white bursts, smaller than flak bursts, appeared simultaneously at our level, off to one side.


One B-17 dropped out on fire and put its wheels down while the crew bailed out. Three ME-109's circled it closely, but held their fire, apparently ensuring that no one stayed in the ship to try for home. I saw Hun fighters hold their fire even when being shot at by a B-17 from which the crew were bailing out.

Near the IP at 1150 hours, one hour and a half after the first of at least 200 individual fighter attacks, the pressure eased off, although hostiles were in the wichnity. We turned at the IP at 1154 hours with 14 B-17's left in the group, two of which were badly crippled. They dropped out soon after bombing the targed and headed for Switzerland, one of them, "042", carrying Col. William Kennedy as tail-gumer. No. 4 engine wason fire, but not our of control. Major William Veal, leader of the high squadron, received a cannon shell in his No. 5 engine just before the start of the bombing run and went in to the target with his prop feathered.


Weather over the target, as on the entire trip, was ideal. First was negligible. The group got iss bombs away promptly on the leader. As we turned and headed for the Alps. I got a grim satisfaction out of seeing a rectangular column of smoke rising straight up from the ME 109 shops, with only one burst over in the town of Regensburg.

The rest of the trip was a marked anti-climax, A few more fightern peaked at us on the way to the Alps. A town in the Brenner Pass tossed up a lone burst of futile flak. Golonel LeMay, who had taken excellent care of us all the way, circled the air division over Lake Garda long enough to give the cripples a chance to join the femily, and we were on our way toward the Mediterranean in mightammam a gradual descent. About twenty five (25) fighters on the ground at Verena stayed on the ground. The prospect of ditching as we approached Bone, short of fuel, and the sight of other B-17's falling into the drink, seemed trivial matters after the vicious nightmare of the long trip across southern Germany. We felt the reaction of men who had not expected to see another sumset.


At 1815 hours, with red lights showing on all our fuel tanks in my ship, the seven B-17's out of the group who were still in formation circled over Bertoux and Isaded in the dust. Our crew was unscratched. Sole damage to the airplane; a bit of ventilation around the tail from flak and 20 mm shells. We slept on the hard ground under the wings of our B-17; but the good earth felt softer than a silk pillow.




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1952 and of seven (7) months at the front in Spain in 1958, voiced the opinion of the crew to the undersigned when he stated that the completion of the mission was soley due to the extraordinary heroism and inspired determination of Major Gleven. The undersigned believes that under the circumstances which obtained, Major Cleven's actions were far above and beyond the call of duty, and that the skill, courage and strength of will displayed by him as airplane and squadron commander in the face of hopeless odds have wint seiden, if ever, been surpassed in the annals of the Army Air Perces.



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